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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RANDY M. LANE

]

PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 20888

-vsTHE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
]
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,
]
Defendant Respondent.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of a decision of the Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter
"Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-10(i) (1953 &
Supp. 1985) which reversed the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") allowing unemployment
compensation benefits to appellant Randy Lane (hereinafter
"Lane") effective April 14, 1985, on the basis that he was
discharged from his employment for "just cause".

1

DISPOSITION BELOW
Lane filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits on April 15r 1985. A Department of Employment
Security Representative, in a decision dated April 28, 1985,
denied that claim effective April 14, 1985.

Lane filed a

timely appeal of the denial of benefits to an ALJ who
conducted an administrative hearing on June 5r 1985. Lane
was not represented at that hearing.

The ALJ took evidence

and heard testimony and thereafter reversed the decision of
the Department Representative and allowed benefits for the
reason that Lane's conduct was not so culpable as to merit a
disqualification pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l)
(1953 & Supp. 1985).

Lane's employer, Telum, Inc.

(hereinafter "Telum") filed an appeal of the ALJ's decision
with the Board on July 1, 1985.

The Board reversed the

decision of the ALJ based on a finding that Lane was
discharged for just cause, thereby denying him unemployment
compensation benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.
35-4~5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Lane requests this Court to reverse the decision of
the Board and enter an order that he is entitled, as a matter
of law, to unemployment compensation benefits from April 14,
1985, until he is no longer otherwise eligible.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lane was employed by Telum as a co-assistant
manager with his wife of a diesel fuel truck stop from March
2

20, 1980r through April 7, 1985. (R.0044). On April 7, 1985,
Lane was fired from his employment with Telum for selling
beer to a minor. (R.0048,0068,0070). The incident for which
Lane was discharged occurred at 10:30 p.m., April 5, 1985.
(R.0037,0065).

On that evening Lane and his wife were

working at the gas station.

Officer Steve Johnson of the

Parowan City Police Department entered the station and asked
to see Lane's wife.

The officer and Lane's wife went into

the backroom of the station at which time Officer Johnson
informed Mrs. Lane that she was under arrest for selling beer
to a minor.

She denied the accusation.

Officer Johnson

stated that he had seen the sale through the window with
binoculars.

After Mrs. Lane continued to deny the

accusation, Officer Johnson took Mrs. Lane outside to "take a
look at the kid" who purchased the beer.

That person changed

his story and said it was Mr. Lane who sold him the beer.
Thereafter, Mr. Lane was issued a citation for selling
alcohol to a minor. (R.0045,0046,0065).
Lane did, in fact, sell beer to the person alleged
to be a minor and he did not check the person for
identification prior to the sale. (R.0054).

The person he

sold the beer to was in the station when it was crowded.
(R.0057,0060,0071).

The person was wearing old clothes, had

a beard and a slouched hat and appeared to Lane to be over 21
years old, therefore not requiring any identification for the
beer purchase. (R.0057).

3

Lane was aware of a company policy that beer was
not to be sold to minors, (R.0054).

It was the accepted

arrangement to check the identification of any person seeking
to purchase beer whose age was questionable, (R.0071).

The

person to whom Lane sold the beer did not appear to be of
questionable age. (R.0057,0071)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

The Board specifically applied Utah Department

of Employment Security Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) to the
facts of this case in determining that Lane was discharged
for just cause.

Howeverf the Utah Administrative Rulemaking

Act specifies certain procedural requirements which must be
complied with before a rule takes effect.

The Department of

Employment Security did not adopt a final version of the rule
nor publish the rule's effective date.

Thus, the proposed

rule is invalid since it was not adopted in compliance with
the procedural requirements of the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.
B.

Even assuming arguendo that Utah Department of

Employment Security Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A) is
applicable its application requires a finding that Lane was
not discharged for just cause.

The Board's decision to the

contrary which reversed the ALJ is unreasonable and
irrational.

Just cause is premised on a finding of fault and

requires consideration of three elements:

culpability,

knowledge and control. When Lane's actions are considered
under this standard a finding of just cause is unreasonable
4

and irrational.

Lane's conduct was an isolated incident of

poor judgment and shows no wrongness or culpability*
Further, Lane's employer did not provide a clear explanation
of expected behavior or have a pertinent written policy.
Thus, Lane had no clear knowledge that his actions would
result in termination.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
PROPOSED RULE A71-01-1:5(A) IS INVALID
AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
ADOPTED AS A FINAL RULE PURSUANT TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING ACT.
The Board specifically applied Utah Department of
Employment Security (hereinafter "UDES") Proposed Rule
A71-07-l:5(A)(3) to the facts of this case in determining
that Lane was discharged for "just cause" as that term is
used in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985).
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) is attached hereto as
Appendix A.

This court has held that an administrative law

judge's decision based on UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(2)
was reasonable and rational and that its application to the
facts of that case was proper. Kehl v. Board of Review,
P.2d 1129r 1133 (Utah 1985).

700

However, Lane submits that the

parties in Kehl did not brief and the Utah Supreme Court did
not address the procedural aspect involved in adopting and
applying an administrative regulation, that is, whether the

5

proposed rule is invalid and unenforceable because it was not
adopted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
The parties in Kehl only argued whether the proposed
regulation met the reasonable and rational standard of
review, See Brief for Respondent at 7-14, and whether the
facts satisfied the just cause requirement, See Brief for
Appellant at 3-8.
In the administrative law context, courts typically
review three aspects of agency determinationss statutory,
substantive and procedural, R. Pierce, Administrative Law and
Process, Sec, 5.1 (1985).

The statutory element refers to

determining whether the agency has the power to promulgate
the regulation involved.

The substantive element refers to

the standard of review a court uses in reviewing the agency
decision, in this cases whether the agency decision is
reasonable and rational.

The procedural element refers to

whether the rule was adopted in conformity with the statutory
requirements for adopting a rule or regulation.
Lane does not contend that the Industrial
Commission is not authorized to promulgate the rule at issue
pursuant to its powers set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec.
35-4-ll(a)(1) (1953 & Supp. 1985).

The substantive issue is

The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act was adopted in 1973
and has been amended several times since then. Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 63-46-1 ej: seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984). This Act was
repealed on April 29, 1985, and replaced with a new Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-l
et seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985). The choice of law issue is
discussed infra.
6

discussed in Point II, infra.

However, the Board applied a

proposed rule which had not been adopted in final form
pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act*

The Kehl case did not address the propriety

of applying a rule which had not been adopted pursuant to
statutory requirements and, therefore, is not dispositive of
the instant case.
At the outset it is necessary to recognize that
there are two potentially pertinent rulemaking acts*

The

first Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act was adopted in 1973*
Utah Code Ann, Sec. 63-46-1 ejb seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984),
That Act was repealed on April 29, 1985r and replaced with a
new Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act*
63-46a-l e_t seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985).

Utah Code Ann. Sec.
Two important dates in

the instant case straddle the effective date of the 1985 Act.
UDES set the rulemaking procedure in motion when it filed the
notice of Proposed Rule A71-01-1.5 on March 20, 1985.
State Bulletin, No. 85-7, at 10 (April 1, 1985).

Utah

The filing

of the proposed rule prior to the effective date of the 1985
Act indicates that the procedures under the 1973 Act should
be applied.

On the other hand, the proposed rule was applied

to the instant case after the 1985 Act took effect.

However,

as will be seen, the application of either the 1973 Act or
the 1985 Act will result in an identical outcome.
The 1973 Act and the 1985 Act do not apply to every
policy statement promulgated by an administrative agency.
Each governs only when the particular issuance comes within
7

the definition of a "Rule", The terra "Rule" is given
meaning under both the 1973 and 1985 ActSo

A "Rule"

defined in the 1973 Act ass
Each statement of general applicability
adopted by an agency that implements or
interprets the law or prescribes the
policy of the agency in the
administration of its functions or
describes the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of any agency,
including any amendment or repeal of a
prior rule. "Rule" does not include :
(a) rules or regulations concerning only
the internal management of an agency not
affecting private rights or procedures
available to the public including those
of the state board of education in its
relationships with local boards of
education, or (b) declaratory rulings
issued pursuant to section 63-46-10, or
(c) intra-agency memoranda.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-3(4) (1953 & Supp. 1984).
Similarly, under the 1985 Act a Rule:
means a statement made by an agency that
applies to a general class of persons,
rather than specific persons and: (i)
implements or interprets policy made by
statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of
the agency in the absence of express
statutory policy? or (iii) prescribes the
administration of the agency's functions
or describes its organization,
procedures, and operations. "Rule"
includes the amendment or repeal of an
existing rule. "Rule" does not include:
(i) statements concerning only the
internal management of an agency and
which do not affect private persons as a
class, other agencies, or other
governmental entities; (ii) declaratory
rulings pursuant to Section 63-46a-14; or
(iii) executive orders.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-2(1)(8)(a) and (b).
8

In the instant case UDES Proposed Rule
A71-07-1:5(A) meets the definition of a "Rule" under either
Act.

Clearly it applies to a general class of persons.

The

very purpose of proposing the rule was to include the rule in
the UDES Rules and Regulations so as to have a comprehensive
scheme for administering the Employment Security Act.

UDES

Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) is addressed to indicated but
unnamed and unspecified persons and situations and,
therefore, is a rule of general applicability.

It is a rule

that is being applied to all future cases of which the
instant case is one.

Thus, the proposed rule is subject to

the rulemaking provisions of either Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-5 (1953 & Supp.

1984) or Sec. 63-46a-3(3) (1953 & Supp. 1985).
After a proposed rule has been drafted, the agency
must comply with certain procedural requirements before it
takes effect.

The procedure mandated by both the 1973 Act

and the 1985 Act consists of three major elements: (1) notice
of intent to implement the rule, (2) opportunity for public
comment, and (3) adoption.

In the instant case, the

Industrial Commission provided notice of its intent to adopt
the Rule on March 20, 1985.
10 (April 1, 1985).
public comment.

Utah State Bulletin, No. 85-7 at

It also allowed an opportunity for

However, the agency has not adopted a final

version of the rule and filed it pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 63-46-6 of the 1973 Act.

Nor has it provided

notification to the Office of Administrative Rules of when
9

the rule becomes effective so that the effective date could
be published in the Utah State Bulletin as required by Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-4(a) of the 1985 Act.
The legal consequence of the Industrial
Commission's failure to follow the required rulemaking
procedure is apparent.

The drafters of both the 1973 and the

1985 Acts mandated that noncompliance with the Act would
render the rule invalid.

The 1973 Act provides that "no rule

hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial
compliance with this section.

Utah Code Ann. Sec.

63-46-5(b)(6) (1953 & Supp. 1984).

Furthermore, Utah Code

Ann. Sec. 63-46-5.3 (1953 & Supp. 1984) provided that:
A rule adopted more than 60 days after
the final day of any public hearing, or
after publication of the rule in
accordance with section 63-46-6 if no
hearings are held regarding the rule,
shall not be valid.
The 1985 Act impliedly recognizes the invalidity of a rule
that was not adopted in compliance with the procedural
requirements of the Act by enacting a statute which limits
such a cause of action to two years. Utah Code Ann. Sec.
63-46a-14 (1953 & Supp. 1985).
It is a basic principle of administrative law that
a rule has no effect if not adopted in compliance with
procedural requirements.

See Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676

Fed. 352 (9th Cir. 1982) and cases cited therein.

The

corollary of that principle is that a valid rule or
10

regulation has the force and effect of law, Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 60 L. Ed.2d 208 (1979);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L.
Ed.2d 1039 (1974); State v. Kerry, 663 P.2d 500 (Wash App.
1983); Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51
(Idaho 1979); Appeal of J.G. Masonary, 235 Kan. 497, 680 P.2d
291 (Kansas 1984); Nevada Tax Commission v. Saveway, 668 P.2d
291 (Nev. 1983); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wy. 1984).
Since rules have the full force and effect of law
affecting legal rights and obligations in the same manner as
laws enacted by the legislature, strict compliance with the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act is a sine qua non of a
fair administrative law system.

Otherwise, parties are

prejudiced by an agency's failure to give notice of a new
rule and its effective date.

Noncompliance with an adoption

procedure prevents potentially affected parties from timely
structuring their affairs to account for new regulations.
See A.Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to
Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 la L.Rev. 731, 873-74
(1975).

Further, allowing an agency to apply a rule not

promulgated pursuant to the statutory requirements sends a
message to agencies that rulemaking provisions will not be
enforced, with the effect of ultimately destroying the
purpose of the Act. J[d.

Technical noncompliance with the

Rulemaking Act should not be tolerated.

This is especially

true in the instant case, since there has been no notice that
11

the UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) has been adopted as a
final rule with an effective date.
Application of the proposed rule by the Industrial
Commission and the Board allows them, in essence,
"secret law."

to apply a

And, by analogizing the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking Act to the Federal Register Act, which requires
publication of proposed and final federal administrative
rules, a federal circuit court has held the purpose of the
Act was "to eliminate the problem of secret law."

Cervase v.

Office of Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166, 1171 (3rd Cir.
1978).
The result of applying to Lane a proposed rule
which has the force and effect of law is unbearable when
there is the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act - a procedure
for a system of rules publication.

To quote an English

observers
It would be intolerable if it could be
said that obscure clerks in Whitehall
poured forth streams of departmental
legislation which nobody had any means of
knowing. This would be the method
attributed to Caligula of writing his
laws in very small characters and hanging
them up on high pillars "the more
effectively to ensnare the people'.
Carr, in committee on Ministers' Powers, Minutes of Evidence
208 (1932).
Finally, the remedy for applying a proposed rule
which is invalid because it was not adopted pursuant to the
statutory procedures of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking
12

Act is reversal*

The Nevada Supreme Court reversed a lower

court decision which applied a rate-making schedule not
promulgated according to the state's rulemaking statute,
Gibben v. Archie, 548 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Nev. 1976).

Similarly

the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Bureau of
Indian Affairs refusal to grant an Indian family's request
for financial aid because the denial was based on a rule
which had not been adopted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act.

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199f 94 S.Ct. 1055r

39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974).

Lane submits the Utah Supreme Court

should do the same in the instant case.
POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PROPOSED RULE
A71-07-l:5(A) IS APPLICABLE, THE DECISION
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW REVERSING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION IS
UNREASONABLE AND IRRATIONAL SINCE THE
BOARD MISAPPLIED THE FACTS TO THE LAW IN
HOLDING THAT LANE'S CONDUCT SUPPORTED A
DISCHARGE FOR "JUST CAUSE"
The appropriate standard of review in a case such
as this is stated in Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d at
1133.

In that case involving a discharge for just cause the

court applied the "intermediate" standard of review outlined
in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 609-612 (Utah 1983).

After

quoting the standard as expressed in Utah Department of
Administrative Services the court in Kehl, at 1133, held that
"... unless the administrative law judge's decision based on
the proposed rules and regulations is outside the limits of
13

reasonableness or rationality, we will uphold it." This
standard has been applied by the Court in subsequent cases.
Board of Education of Seiver County v. Board of Reviewr 701
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1985); Wrights Furniture Mill, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 8,9 (Utah 1985)?
Rahimi v. Board of Review, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,10 (Utah
1985) .
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several
occasions that the Board of Review exceeded the limits of
reasonableness.

Clearfield City v. Department of Employment

Security, 663 P,2d 440 (Utah 1983); Trotta v. Department of
Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, (Utah 1983); Western
Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. v. Board of Review, 684 P.2d 647
(Utah 1985).

In addition, the Supreme Court is required to

review the record below, Martinez v. Board of Review, 567
P.2d 626 (Utah 1977), and is not bound by conclusions of the
Board of Review nor will it substitute missing findings in
order to corroborate a decision of the Board of Review which
is not supported by the record.

Gocke v. Wiesly, 420 P.2d 44

(Utah 1966).
In the present case, the decision of the Board,
which reversed the ALJ's award of benefits, was unreasonable
and irrational and, therefore, must be reversed.

The ALJ in

his June 24, 1985, decision concluded that*
Even though selling alcoholic beverages
to minors is a serious offense, the
evidence in this case established that
the claimant had committed an error in
judgment but there was nothing to show a
14

deliberate or willful action against the
employer* He mistakenly believed the
individual was of legal age. The
employer did not have any definite policy
regarding age verification. The claimant
had not had any prior problems with
discipline and it is determined the
situation was an isolated incident. The
event was not culpable to such a degree
as to merit a disqualification under
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah
Employment Security Act. It isf
therefore, concluded the claimant was not
discharged for just cause in accordance
with the Utah Employment Security Act.
(R.0032)
The ALJ considered the credibility and demeanor of Lane and
his witness and determined that Lane mistakenly believed the
individual to whom he sold the beer was of legal age to
purchase it.

Thisf combined with the fact that the employer

had no definite policy regarding age verification, led the
ALJ to conclude that Lane's conduct was not culpable to such
a degree as to merit a disqualification and therefore he "was
not discharged for just cause."

As the ALJ concluded, Lane

"had committed an error in judgment."

(R.0032).

Such a

finding is based in large part on the credibility and
demeanor of Lane.

Where, as in the present case, culpability

and knowledge are determinative factors, substantial
deference should be given to the ALJ since he had the
opportunity to weigh the credibility of Lane and his witness.
The Board's decision was made by reviewing only a bare
transcript.

The Board did not have the opportunity to

observe Lane and his witness and judge their credibility, as

15

did the ALJ.

Therefore, substantial deference should be

given to the ALJ's decision.
Considering the deference which should be given to
the ALJ's decision and applying the facts of this case to
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A), a finding should have been
made that Lane was not terminated with just cause.

The

Board's decision to the contrary is unreasonable and
irrational.

The proposed rule requires that in order for

there to be just cause for a discharge pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985) there must be some
fault on the part of the employee.
A71-07-1J5(A)(2).

UDES Proposed Rule

The proposed rule further provides that

there are three basic factors which establish fault and are
essential for a determination of ineligibility under the
definition of just cause:
control.

culpability, knowledge and

UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3). Lane submits

that the evidence in the record supports the ALJ's decision
that Lane was not discharged for just cause.
First, Lane's conduct was not culpable within the
meaning of UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a). As noted
above, the ALJ held that the evidence established Lane had
"committed an error in judgment but there was nothing to show
a deliberate or willful action against the employer."
(R.0032).

As the proposed rule provides*
If the conduct was an isolated incident
of poor judgment and there is no
expectation that the conduct will be
continued or repeated, potential harm may
16

not be shown and therefore it is not
necessary to discharge the employee.
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a)•

The Board rejected

the ALJ's conclusion and stated that:
..•the Utah Supreme Court has held, in a
case involving violation of an employer's
rule regarding attendance, that a single
violation of an employer's rule may be
sufficient to warrant disqualification
from unemployment benefits where the
employee reasonably should have known
that a violation would interrupt the
employer's operations.
Trotta v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1983) .
The Boardr however, places its emphasis on two
misconceptions.

First, there is no evidence in the record

except a written double hearsay statement made by a
department representative submitted to the ALJ (R.0067) which
supports the Board's finding that "the claimant's conviction
resulted in the employer being put on a 30-day probationary
period and could result in further legal sanctions in the
form of the revocation of the license to sell beer".
(R.0022).

Lane spoke to the county commission and was told

that the company was in no jeopardy whatsoever of losing its
license. (R.0055)
Next, the Board emphasized the company rule that
prohibited the sale of beer to minors.

However, the emphasis

should not be on that rule but rather on whether there was a
Telum rule or policy regarding which customers were to be
17

asked for identification and whether Lane violated that
policy.

That was the approach taken by the ALJ.

The record

is clearr as the ALJ found, there was no formal policy on
which customers should be made to present identification
before being allowed to purchase beer.
0057,0071).

(R.0032,0049,0056,

The policy, as Lane understood it, was to ask

for identification of anyone whose age was questionable.
(R.0071).

He did not ask for identification in the incident

in question because the customer "looked over 21."
(R.0057,0071).

The real issue in determining culpability is

whether Lane was at fault for not requesting identification
from the minor to whom he sold the beer.

The record is

uncontroverted that there was no "wrongness of conduct" but
simply a spontaneous judgment call which was later revealed
to be incorrect.

Therefore, the rationale relied upon by the

Board as stated in Trotta, at 1200, and Kehl, at 1134, is
factually inapplicable to the instant case and not
controlling.

Lane's conduct does not meet the culpability

requirement of the proposed rule simply because there was a
reasonable misjudgment in an isolated instance.
The second element required by UDES Proposed Rule
A71-07-l:5(A) is that Lane must have had knowledge of the
conduct expected by the employer.

Again the Board emphasized

the company policy which prohibited the sale of beer to
minors.

However, in establishing the knowledge requirement

it is necessary to examine the policy of which customers were
to be asked for identification before they would be sold
18

beer.

As noted above, there was no clear explanation of

which customers were to be asked for identification.

The

proposed rule, in relevant part, provides:
Knowledge may not be established unless
the employer gave a clear explanation of
the expected behavior or had a pertinent
written policy, except in the case of a
flagrant violation of a universal
standard of behavior. If the employer's
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or
inconsistent, the existence of knowledge
is not shown. A specific warning is one
way of showing that the employee had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After
the employee is given a warning he should
be given an opportunity to correct
objectionable conduct. Additional
violations occurring after the warning
would be necessary to establish just
cause for a discharge.
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A)(3)(b).
The age of the person who purchased the beer was
not questionable in Lane's mind.

If Telum wished to

establish a policy which would give direction to employees in
a case such as this one it could have done so by, for
example, adopting a policy requiring every purchaser of beer
to provide identification or by requiring any purchaser of
beer who did not appear to be over 40 years of age to provide
identification.

In any event, the policy should be made

clear to the employees and take into consideration possible
misjudgments.

A failure to do so results in an employee not

having knowledge of expected conduct.

The basic policy that

beer was not to be sold to minors does not provide an
employee with guidance as to ascertaining who is not of legal
19

age to purchase beer.

Knowledge can only be established in

this case by showing that Telum had a policy of which
customers would be requested to present identification before
being allowed to purchase beer and that policy was clearly
communicated to Lane. The record is devoid of any such
showing.

Simply knowing that beer was not to be sold to

minors does not meet Telum's burden of showing a clearly
communicated policy because it is so nonspecific that it has
no practical application.
A similar, but not inapplicable analogy would be to
allow an employer to establish a company rule that employees
must not violate state health laws and then discharge an
employee who, for example, did not wear a hair net which was
required by state law, even though the employee had not been
previously instructed by the employer on how to comply with
the law, i.e. an instruction by the employer that a hair net
was required.

By focusing on the lack of company policy on

which customers were to provide identification before being
allowed to purchase beer, it becomes clear that Lane had no
clear explanation of expected behavior.

Lane could not have

known that his failure to ask for identification from the
person whose age he determined not to be questionable would
result in his termination.
The third element required by Proposed Rule
A-71-07-l:5(A) is that "The conduct must have been within the
power and capacity of the claimant to control or prevent."
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1s5(A)(3)(c). The Board's only
20

statement that the control element was satisfied was that
"The evidence demonstrates that the claimant was not
prevented from checking the ID of the purchaser." (R.0022).
Lane acknowledges that he was not prevented from requesting
identification from the purchaser but, rather, asserts that
he was following the policy, as he understood it, of
requesting identification from any person whose age was
questionable*
Therefore, by applying UDES Proposed Rule
A-71-07-1:5(A) to the instant case it is clear that the Board
in reversing the ALJ's decision acted unreasonably and
irrationaly because it focused on a broad policy rule and not
the specific means by which the policy was to be implemented.
Further, it was unreasonable for the Board to conclude that
Lane's conduct was in any manner culpable or somehow wanton.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasonsf Lane submits that the
Board of Review's application of UDES Proposed Rule
A71-01-1:5(A) is invalid and unenforceable because it was not
adopted pursuant to the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act andr therefore, its decision
should be reversed and the ALJ's decision reinstated.
However, even assuming arguendo that the proposed rule is
applicable, Lane has established that he was not discharged
for just cause.

His uncontroverted testimony establishes

that his conduct was not culpable and that he had no
knowledge of the conduct his employer expected.
21

Thus, the

Board's decision reversing the ALJ was unreasonable and
irrational and should therefore be reversed.
DATED this / ^ % a y of November, 1985.
Respectfully Submitted:
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

CURTIS L. CHILD
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant
to K. Alan Zabel, Special Assistant, Attorney General, The
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment
Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147,
via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid this 2r day of
November, 1985.
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PROPOSED
A7i-U7-1:5
(II)-l

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY -~ RULES AND REGULATIONS

35-4-5(b) DISCHARGE
Section 35-4-5:
"An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(b)(1) For the week in which he has been discharged for
just cause or for an act or omission in connection with
employment, not constituting a crime, which Is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful
interest, if so found by the commission, and thereafter
until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least
six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount 1n oona
fide covered employment."

A.

GENERAL DEFINITION

1. When an employee quits his job, there Is no question that he intended to
become separated from that employment. The purpose of this section 1s to deny
the benevolent benefits of the statute to individuals who bring about their own
unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect to their employment with
callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that the
employer was justified in discharging the employee. However, when an employee is
discharged by his employer, such discharge may have been the result of incompetence, lack of skill, or other reasons which are beyond the claimant's control.
The question which must be established by the evidence is whether the claimant is
at fault in his resulting unemployment.
2. Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just
cause for discharging the employee. However, not e^ery cause for discharge provides a basis to deny benefits. In order to have just cause for discharge
pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must be some fault on the part of the
employee involved.
3. The basic factors which establish fault, and are essential for a determination of ineligibility under the definition of just cause are:
a

* Culpability. This is the seriousness of the conduct as it affects
continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests. A discharge would not be considered "necessary" if it 1s not
consistent with reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the
conduct must be considered in the context of the particular employment and
how it affects the employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated
incident of poor judgement and there is no expectation that the conduct
will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore
it is not necessary to discharge the employee.
b.

Knowledge.

The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer
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expected* I t is not necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to
the employer, but he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be established unless the
employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had _a
pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a
universal standard of behavior.
I f the employer's expectations are
unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the existance of knowledge 1s not
shown. A specific warning 1s one way of showing that the employee had
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the employee is given a warning
he should be given an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct.
Additional violations occuring after the warning would be necessary to
establish just cause for a discharge.
c. Control. The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of
the claimant to control or prevent.
4. The term "just cause" as used In Section 5(b)(1) does not lessen the
requirement that there be some fault on the part of the employee involved.
Prior to the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commission Interpreted
Section 5(b)(1) to require 9it\ intentional Infliction of harm or intentional
disregard of the employer's Interests. The intent of the Legislature in adding the words "just cause" to Section 5(b)(1,) was apparently to correct this
restrictive interpretation. While some fault must be present, i t is sufficient
that the acts were Intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and
that such acts have serious affect on the employee's job or the employer's
interests.
5. Fault may not be established when the reason for discharge Is based on
such things as mere mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the
result of inability or Incapacity, inadvertence in isolated Instances, goodfaith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These examples of conduct are
not disqualifying because of the lack of knowledge or control. However, continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary,
reasonable workers in similar circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on
the reason and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the
employee.
^.

EViUENCE-BURUEN OF PROOF

S*

l^Tfte^eyidentiary requirement for Department decisions Is a pr^pofuleranee
of the evidernre^It is not necessary to meet criminal cour^t^ltandards of
beyond reasonable d^Ub^^roverwhelmlng evidence. Preponderance means evidence
which Is of greater welghtor^wu^j convincing than t^-etffdence which is offered
1n opposition to I t ; that is, eVTxiem^wh1c|^s^a whole shows that the fact
sought to be proved 1s more probable ^h$B>«#$!. Although the evidence that Is
required for an appeal decision im^Wof
probltTv*^4lue, an initial determination may be made based orj^thfbest or most logical^hrfojcmation available.
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